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How Machines Force Us to 
Rethink What It Means to Be 
Living1 
Steps to an Existential Robotics 
Dominique Lestel 
Ecole normale supérieure de Paris	
 
Not to brag, but I’m not very intelligent either. 
—Haruki Murakami, Kafka on the Shore, 2002/2006. 
The post-biological living world into which we are plunging is incredibly 
complex, for it consists of both organisms and of the ways we manage our 
relations to them. Today, Westerners use a twofold process to approach the 
question of the living: first, they try to establish the frontiers between what is 
living and what is not, and second, they try to establish an objective definition of 
the living in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Proceeding in this 
fashion seems natural to us, for we have become true Cartesians, but it is 
nonetheless very problematic. To approach the living in this way means assuming, 
first, that there exists a class of elements—living beings—that are distinct and 
																																								 																				
1	This	article	was	written	during	a	sabbatical	year	spent	at	the	University	of	Tokyo	with	funding	
from	 the	 CNRS,	 and	 I	 wish	 to	 thank	 Sandra	 Laugier	 and	 Philippe	 Codognet	 for	 their	 help.	
Translation	by	Daniela	Ginsburg	with	Emily	Sekine,	corrected	by	the	author.	
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spontaneously accessible, whose objective properties we can determine through 
observation and experimentation. Second, it means assuming that we need only 
synthesize this class of entities and deduce a few simple principles from it, and we 
will be able to determine what is living and what is not. But this Cartesian 
approach (identification, exhaustive definition and recognition of elements that 
belong to the relevant set) runs into many difficulties: theoretical difficulties, like 
determining the relevance of the criteria used to define the living; practical 
difficulties, such as determining whether viruses or crystals are living or not; and 
logical difficulties, such as knowing if it is legitimate to consider living only what 
is recognized as such in our own culture. Social robotics—that is, the conception 
and construction of robots capable of social interaction with humans, animals, or 
other robots—provides an interesting example in the debate over the frontiers 
between the living and non-living, transforming itself into a field of inquiry of its 
own—existential robotics, which designs ‘living’ robots. It presents us with a 
cognitive conflict between a desire to consider these disturbing artifacts as living 
agents, and the hegemonic understanding of the living in Western cultures, where 
biologists have become the authoritative experts on the subject of life. 
Thinking the Living from a Second-Person Point of View 
Engineers may consider the robots they create to be mere machines—not more 
than toasters, ultimately—if their own experiences working with these robots 
suggests otherwise. This position is no more satisfying than the analytic 
philosophers who want to simply apply the framework of human rights to robots. 
In the case of certain subjects, reasonable responses turn out to be completely 
crazy.2 My own perspective begins with two philosophical texts that seem to me 
of particular interest for understanding what is at stake in existential robotics. The 
first is a note by the American philosopher William James, which lists the reasons 
why a man could never fall in love with an artificial woman. The second is a 
seminal article by the British computing pioneer, Alan Turing, in which he 
presents his famous imitation game—an article so rich that its interpretive 
possibilities are far from having been exhausted. 
In a very concise note published in 1908,3 James establishes a fundamental 
difference between an actual woman and a hypothetical artificial woman who is 
																																								 																				
2	On	this	subject,	see	Günther	Anders	(2002	[1957]:	34–5):	'My	"outrageous"	statement	is	thus	no	
more	than	a	partial	reflection	of	the	"exaggeration"	that	is	actually	happening	today:	it	is	just	an	
outrageous	presentation	of	what	has	already	been	created	in	exaggeration'.	
3	William	James,	‘The	pragmatist	account	of	truth	and	its	misunderstanders’,	Philosophical	Review	
vol.	xvii	(January	1908),	reprinted	in	James,	The	meaning	of	truth:	a	sequel	to	'pragmatism'	(2013	
[1909]),	Chapter	VIII.	
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exactly like a real woman: the latter, he argues, cannot really care about another 
person. She is even less able to care for someone else in a positive way, which 
prevents him from falling in love with her. At best, the artificial woman can 
exhibit mere symptoms, which do not correspond to any real consciousness. Thus, 
James distinguishes artifacts from living beings on the basis of the artifact’s 
inability to care about him—that is, to demonstrate sympathy and recognition, 
love and admiration. As the reader will see shortly, care for me is not exactly the 
same as care for the self. And of course, James is not exactly talking about 
whether or not the artificial woman is able to care for me. For him, the operative 
difference is that the artificial woman does not give me the opportunity to believe 
that she cares about him. What is interesting about James’s remark here is that he 
conceptualizes falling in love from a second-person perspective. The state of 
being in love is based on my representation of the representations of the other in 
this case—the artificial woman—has of me. The difficulty in James’s argument 
lies in the fact that ‘belief’, the concept he mobilizes here, refers to something 
extremely difficult to objectify.  
In this respect, the significance of the ‘Turing Test’ is that it replaces 
belief—an inconsistent psychological state that is terribly tricky to grasp—with an 
interactional plan4 that can be constantly improved.Turing published the article 
outlining his famous test of machine intelligence in 1950. Though the Turing Test 
has been widely discussed over the years, its importance has been underestimated, 
even by those most passionate about it. Indeed, the test presents a very fertile 
conceptual staging of intelligence by adopting a co-optative approach (you belong 
to the club of the intelligent agents if I approve your candidacy)—one very 
different from the usual logical approaches—and by asking whether a computer, 
using only symbolic communication, can trick a human into thinking that it, too, 
is human. The procedure is well-known: a human, H1, poses questions to another 
human, H2, and to a computer, without knowing which one is which. The three 
participants are all in different rooms, and H2 and the machine do not 
communicate with one another. A machine is considered intelligent when H1 
takes it for H2 based on the answers it gives. Turing’s article emphasizes the 
necessity of using a purely symbolic relation: ‘there [is] little point in trying to 
make a “thinking machine” more human by dressing it up in […] artificial flesh’ 
(1950: 434). Turing specifies that the test must take place in conditions of radical 
abstraction, in which the interrogator is prevented ‘from seeing or touching the 
other competitors, or hearing their voices’ (1950: 434). Turing’s test deals with a 
situation of handicap as much as a situation of capacity. We may call this the 
																																								 																				
4	'Plan'	is	used	here	to	translate	the	French	word	'dispositif'	with	the	reference	to	Michel	Foucault	
and	Gilles	Deleuze.	
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test’s central paradox: an agent’s communicational capacity is assessed by placing 
him/her in a situation of extreme communicational poverty. 
Despite these massive handicaps, Turing’s test is based on several pivotal 
changes in how intelligence is viewed:5 the shift from defining intelligence to 
recognizing it; the emphasis on a co-optative approach to intelligence; the 
recognition of ruse and trickery as central to intelligence; and, above all, the 
adoption of a second-person conception of intelligence. This second-person 
perspective is what interests me here, for one of the ambiguities in Turing’s article 
concerns the status attributed to the machine before it is identified as intelligent or 
not. Namely, what is this ‘she/he/it’? The second-person perspective on 
intelligence solves this difficulty: the machine never says ‘I’. The process unfolds 
appropriately, under the direction of a human being who understands it. One is not 
in dialogue but rather having a monologue à deux, until the point that through 
dialogue the machine is revealed to be intelligent. But can the Turing test be 
generalized to apply to the living in general?  
James and Turing each approach their subjects in novel and unusual ways. 
James does so through the possibility of falling in love with an artifact, while 
Turing does so through the machine’s ability to pass for human. Though neither 
James nor Turing explicitly discuss the question of what life is, together they 
point the way to a fertile and original approach for thinking life in a radically new 
way. They provide us with invaluable elements for a concrete, relational, 
perspectivist, and constructivist approach to the question of what is living. This 
approach leaves room for some artifacts and does not immediately slam the door 
shut to the club of the living agents when faced with some slightly exotic entities. 
This approach is very different from the realist, objectivist, causalist, and 
essentialist approach taken by the majority of researchers and philosophers who 
deal with this subject. 
A First-Person Point of View on the Living 
The two texts by James and Turing I have been discussing lead us to the idea that 
the question of what is living for me is perhaps more relevant than the question of 
what the living is more generally. We may also take it one step further to suggest 
that what is living for me is who can share my existence. The idea of a unique 
category containing all that can be classified as living, a category that can be 
objectivized—that is, defined without any reference to a concrete living being—
appears highly problematic given the sheer number and diversity of instances in 
																																								 																				
5	On	this	interpretation	of	the	Turing	Test,	see	Lestel	(1996a)	and	Lestel,	Bec	&	Lemoigne	(1993).		
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which we are willing to recognize the living as living. The problem is the 
universalist ambition that motivates the search for a general definition of the 
living that would apply to all its multiple possibilities. Turing and James draw our 
attention to the fact that when someone identifies an agent as having a somewhat 
complex property—such as love, intelligence, or life—that person participates 
fully in the process of identification. Thus, there is a shift from the third-person 
version of the question—‘What is a living being?’—to the first-person—‘What is 
a living being for me?’ We are led to consider that ultimately what is and is not 
living is a question that must be asked from the first-person point of view, and not 
from the third-person perspective, typical of biologists and Artificial Intelligence 
engineers, who themselves aspire to become kinds of biologists. The advantage of 
the first-person perspective is that the nature of the agent being evaluated 
(whether it is natural or artificial) no longer matters. In this view, the set of living 
beings is the set of all beings recognized as living by at least one other living 
being.6 To adapt Turing and James, a living being is a being I recognize as such 
(Turing), while a being that I do not recognize as such is not living (James). These 
two points of view are complementary rather than redundant; from Turing’s 
perspective, an agent can be considered living as long as I accept that agent as 
such, even if our so-called experts on life (biologists) are not ready to accept that 
agent as belonging to the club of the living. And from James’s perspective, an 
agent that biologists fully accredit as living but who does not convince me, and 
whom I am not ready to accept as living in my own life, will not be considered 
living. In ruder words, biologists are only consultants in the matter of the living, 
and not the ultimate deciders. The space of living beings is not coextensive with 
the space of biologists’ expertise.  
A Second-Person Conception of the Living 
If we read more closely, we can see that James’s and Turing’s texts propose a 
second-person, rather than first-person, understanding of the living. In this 
understanding, I consider you living if I can experience you as living in the 
encounter I have with you, if I can attribute to you a will, a desire, or quite simply 
a point of view that encounters mine (and this is all the more efficient if your 
point of view focuses on me). In the second-person perspective, a subject is 
																																								 																				
6	In	 this	view,	all	prey	 is	 living	and	all	 that	 is	 living	 is	potential	prey.	The	objection	that	earth	 is	
sometimes	eaten	is	not	relevant,	for	it	simply	means	that	at	least	some	earth	is	living.	Trickier	is	
the	objection	that	nobody	eats	an	artifact,	and	thus	no	artifact	is	living.	But	we	may	reply	to	this	
objection	 that	 the	 predator–prey	 relationship	 defines	 an	 operability	 of	 the	 living	 but	 does	 not	
subsume	all	that	lives.		
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constituted through its frictions with interlocutors who consider it, too, to be an 
interlocutor. Only a few philosophers have discussed this idea; they include, in 
particular, Martin Buber (1958) (the individual emerges in the I–Thou 
relationship), Francis Jacques (inter-subjectivity is more important than 
subjectivity in the dialogical phenomenon, and the presence of absence is essential 
in that process), and George Herbert Mead (the self only knows itself by mirroring 
itself in a you, a second-person alter ego). However, all those authors limit 
themselves to verbal dialogue and communication between humans (or between 
humans and God). 7  Opening the second-person perspective to include non-
humans in general, and machines in particular, considerably enlarges the scope of 
this idea, as does shifting from verbal dialogue alone to the encounter between 
points of view. 
The Living as Existential Contract 
I have presented constructivist readings of James and Turing. Whereas the 
American pragmatic philosopher envisioned a somewhat cursory inter-individual 
encounter, the English mathematician set up an elaborate system to deduce the 
nature of an artifact. For Turing, the recognition of an intelligent being is 
concomitant with a somewhat elaborate staging, a point he addresses fully. 
Recognition takes place through a skillfully orchestrated ‘mise en demeure’, a 
competitive space where the elements that may be taken into account are not 
limited beforehand. A machine’s intelligence is not a property that a clever 
philosopher or scientist can discover, but rather an existential contract constructed 
on the basis of available technologies and the desire to deem the artifact living. 
Wanting to have living machines is not, in itself, enough to bring them 
into being. However, the desire for them to exist is a necessary condition for their 
creation. Thus, we must think of contemporary existential robotics as lying at the 
intersection of the conceptualization of what passes for living and what I call 
libidinal plans which manipulate desire for the living and capture the will to admit 
the artifact into the club of living beings. The Swiss artist Christian Denisart, 
whose 2005 piece, Robots! plays with robots and human actors, has perfectly 
grasped this point. He explains that our fascination with robots is tied to the gaze; 
if we put two wheels and eyes on a coffee machine, he suggests, we will end up 
becoming attached to it. Denisart holds that the gaze plays an essential role in the 
ability to give life to an artifact. Moreover, he argues, this life is given through an 
encounter, implying an exchange of points of view. This attitude is very different 
																																								 																				
7	In	the	postface	to	I	and	Thou,	Buber	(1958)	takes	a	timid	step	in	the	direction	of	the	animal,	but	
does	not	go	very	far.		
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from that of classical biology, which bases itself on non-negotiable prerequisites, 
such as whether or not a being has DNA. The constellation of libidinal cultures, 
technological virtuosity, and practices of the living allows us to better understand 
social robots, which both simulate living beings and constitute a trap that captures 
our desire to ‘make life’ with these beings. Here, ‘simulate’ must be taken to 
mean, as it does in French, both ‘to act like’ and ‘to be taken for’. The robot’s 
credibility8 thus comes not only from how we conceive of it, but also from its 
capacity to intoxicate us with our care for it, as well as by its care for us, placing 
each of us within a relationship of mutual dependence. An artifact becomes living 
within a complex plan (technical, social, semiotic, psychological) that makes the 
artifact living for me, on the condition that I desire this situation. This desire is not 
at all a given but is itself already a sophisticated construct. A second-person 
approach to the living thus connects the capacity to conceive of autonomous 
agents with a desire to share a life with them. 
The Emergence of Libidinal Machines 
A key concept for thinking about existential robotics from a constructivist, 
relational, second-person perspective is that of the libidinal machine: a machine 
that arouses and manipulates desire. To ask whether robots can be considered 
living in biological terms is the wrong question. The point is not to lead an a priori 
rebellion against biology, but to give an appropriate response to the question of 
whether at least some social robots can be considered living. This, I must specify, 
is not primarily a psychological question. Rather, existential robotics offers us the 
opportunity to rethink fundamental notions such as life and intelligence, outside 
the traditional spheres of biology or psychology. According to this point of view, 
robotics is non-biological and post-psychological. It is non-biological because it 
puts the field of biology back in its place as the study of carbon-based living 
beings, and not of the living in general. It is post-psychological because it has no 
reason to base itself on over-determined cultural categories such as reason or the 
self9 in order to account for the intelligence of machines. A fruitful approach for 
existential robotics would be to use the difficulties raised as an opportunity to 
move beyond culturally dated categories, rather than trying to apply them to 
today’s quasi-autonomous artifacts. In other words, the question is not whether 
																																								 																				
8	I	 prefer	 the	 notion	 of	 'credibility'	 [vraisemblance]	 to	 that	 of	 ‘realism’	 because	 the	 former	 is	
clearly	 a	 relational	 concept,	 while	 the	 latter	 is	 an	 ontological	 concept	 that	 implies	we	 already	
know	what	the	real	is,	whereas	that	is	precisely	part	of	the	problem.	
9	There	is	an	entire	movement	within	cognitive	psychology	that	considers	robotics	very	important	
for	 studying	 the	 functioning	 of	 children.	 To	my	mind,	 this	 is	 a	 waste	 of	 time	 and	 is	 based	 on	
erroneous	reasoning.	
	
D.	Lestel.	How	Machines	Force	Us	to	Rethink	What	It	Means	to	Be	Living	
45	
NatureCulture	2017	
Copyright	owned	by	the	authors	
robots are alive or not, but what devices I can mobilize and what practices I am 
prepared to engage in to make them so. Existential robotics has always been 
focused on a somewhat rough harnessing of the desire to grant robots the status of 
living beings. 
The anthropologist Natasha Schull brilliantly explains the concept of 
libidinal machines, though she herself never uses the term. By analyzing the 
connivances between the technical characteristics of games of chance in Las 
Vegas casinos (which are nowadays based on digital technologies) and the 
phenomenology of players’ experiences, Schull (2005) dissects the logic of the 
libidinal dispositions that artifacts can create in humans. In particular, she breaks 
down the intimate connection that links states of extreme subjective absorption in 
the game to procedures used to manipulate space and time so the player will spend 
as much money as possible on slot machines. The device is created to instill a 
dissociated subjective state that gamblers call the “zone”, in which conventional 
spatial, bodily, monetary, and temporal parameters are suspended. The zone 
requires a set of well-identified parameters: being alone, not being interrupted, 
speed, the ability to choose (even if the procedures for choosing are rigged), and 
having to follow a certain rhythm (Schull 2005: 73). Speed, especially, is an 
important aspect of the zone, for that is what, above all, gives players a sense of 
control. The game is artificially augmented by artifices such as pop-ups and pre-
programmed segments, but the player thinks s/he controls the process. Thus, it is 
easy for players to develop the fantasy that they can get inside the machine (a 
fantasy perfectly illustrated by the film Tron). 
In the economy of the zone, money loses its charge as a material means of 
acquisition and exchange and is converted into the currency of play, a 
supraeconomic means of suspension from conventional circuits of 
exchange: ‘You’re not playing for money; you’re playing for credit. Credit so 
you can sit there longer, which is the goal. It’s not about winning; it’s about 
continuing to play’ (Schull 2005: 75). 
From the beginning, social robots have generated and manipulated desire; 
they arouse it and are made to respond to it.10 To reduce social robots to pure 
functionalities is to take an impoverished view of them, which also makes it 
difficult to understand what is really at stake. This is why it is particularly relevant 
to pay attention to early works of fiction on social robots (Ernest Theodor 
																																								 																				
10	This	 is	a	point	clearly	grasped	by	Emmanuel	Grimaud	and	Zaven	Paré	(2011).	Well	before	the	
creation	of	modern	robotics,	the	American	writer	Ambrose	Bierce	(1966)	had	a	similar	intuition,	
placing	desire	at	the	center	of	a	curious	short	story	he	published	in	1910,	though	the	desire	he	
described	was	that	of	an	artifact	and	not	only	of	the	human	who	created	and	interacted	with	the	
machine.	 In	Bierce’s	story,	the	 inventor	Moxon	is	strangled	by	the	machine	that	has	 just	 lost	at	
chess	and	cannot	bear	defeat.	
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Amadeus Hoffmann, Auguste Villiers de L’Isle-Adam, etc.), which explicitly 
describe machines that arouse desire. As the reader will recall, Frankenstein’s 
problem was precisely that his creature wanted to experience love. 11  No 
determinism imposed that yearning. Other cultures have made different choices—
for example, situating intelligent artifacts in the space of mediation between gods, 
spirits, and demons. In Western culture, art and literature have proven more adept 
than scientific thought at dealing with the issues raised by social robots. The 
sociologist Sherry Turkle (2011)—who worries about the fact that we can make a 
robot say ‘I love you’—misses some of the major challenges and goals of robotics 
by remaining within an overly conventional intellectual space, although she was 
one of the first to emphasize the identitarian aspect of new information 
technologies. 
 
	
The	bride	of	Frankenstein	(1935)	
Thus, the status of social robots is not as clear-cut as one might imagine. It 
is a matter not so much of determining whether these creatures are alive, but of 
recognizing their fundamental ambivalence in the space of the living. Within the 
																																								 																				
11	In	his	work	Frankenstein:	mythe	et	philosophie	(1988),	the	psychoanalyst	Jean-Jacques	Lecercle	
shows	that	Frankenstein’s	creation	of	 the	monster	 is	analogous	to	a	sexual	act,	and	one	of	 the	
most	successful	Frankenstein	movies	is	Whale’s	second,	The	bride	of	Frankenstein	(1935).		
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perspective I have been discussing, the question is infinitely broader and richer 
than the question of whether robots can, for example, be held ‘responsible’ or 
whether we have ethical obligations towards some of them. It is unrealistic to 
think we can use our conventional, habitual categories from technology and the 
history of technology to think about these artifacts. Rather, it seems important to 
me to consider robots as belonging to the category of meaningful artifacts, a 
category generally neglected by historians and philosophers of technology but 
frequently discussed by anthropologists, ethno-psychiatrists, and art historians. 
These are artifacts that do not serve to do something but instead contribute to 
giving meaning and presence to a certain space or situation. These artifacts 
generate existences12 or presences rather than procedures, though they can also 
generate procedures. They are artifacts that form particular relations to the living 
and present a particular view of the living. Treating existential robotics as a matter 
of engineering replacements for living beings is the wrong path; robots are 
artifacts that force us to rethink what the living can be for us, and this is what 
makes them so interesting. But the phenomenon of living artifacts did not emerge 
with robots or computers, as the majority of contemporary theoreticians believe. 
Living artifacts have a rich and complex history that includes puppets as well as 
fetishes, charms, and amulets. One of the main characteristics of such artifacts is 
that they can only function within systems of performance (some of which have 
been studied in depth by anthropologists). Clearly, this is also characteristic of 
robots. 
The Performances of Existential Robotics 
Taking a constructivist, relational position allows us to escape having to choose 
between an essentialist scientific view and a conventional relativist view, neither 
of which is satisfying. One of the difficulties in thinking about existential robotics 
lies in the overly bureaucratic organization of disciplines within universities. Our 
clear-cut categories of engineering, science, philosophy, anthropology, religion, 
art, and literature make it difficult to grasp the complexity of what is at stake with 
robots that/who are personalizing. Existential robotics must be studied at the 
intersection of multiple disciplinary fields that are typically thought of as separate.  
The historian James P. Carse (1987) establishes an interesting opposition 
between finite games and infinite games, which is useful to consider here. Finite 
games are those that end with a winner and a loser, whereas infinite games seek to 
prolong themselves as long as possible. For him, life itself is the classic example 
																																								 																				
12	In	this	text,	I	use	‘existence’	in	the	existentialist	rather	than	ontological	sense.		
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of an infinite game, even if it is one that, paradoxically, the player will always 
lose. Similarly, a social robot is part of a collaborative game in which humans and 
machine play at giving life to the artifact in a (potentially) infinite way. The 
decisive issue is how to play with the robot, and in what arenas of performance. 
The hope is that somehow we will produce something belonging to the living 
(rather than of the living), but when the performative aspect of robotics is 
neglected, we deprive ourselves of the means (that is, the necessary staging) to do 
that. Existential robotics exists in a state of permanent performance, though the 
majority of robotics specialists refuse to pay the least bit of attention to this fact.13 
When robotics specialists do attend to the performative dimension, as does the 
Japanese roboticist Hiroshi Ishiguro, they overemphasize the spectacle that robots 
provide and see it as exceptional. But it is not that robots either function normally 
or as part of a spectacle: robotics is spectacle. 
Hybrid Communities Negotiating Existence 
Within the constructivist and relational approach that I have been describing here, 
the status of robots is not given from the outset: It evolves gradually on the basis 
of the existential choices we make and the plan through which we give robots a 
place. Making some of our artifacts come alive does not only mean transforming 
them technically so that they conform to a pre-established norm; it also means 
transforming ourselves so that our existences and the existences of certain 
artifacts are mutually compatible. In other words, the goal of social robots is to 
create hybrid communities of shared meaning, interests, and affects14 with agents 
whose very status as living is part of what must be negotiated within the 
community—though this is never the only thing the community must negotiate. It 
is the question of existence, rather than of life in the strict sense, that is at stake. 
One way to achieve compatibility is to ‘become machine’ [s’enmachiner]. A more 
fertile, productive approach would be to mobilize engaging fictions that compel us 
to re-conceptualize the porousness of the space of the living. This effort, in turn, 
would help us to see the challenges that robots pose as opportunities for 
rethinking the place of animism in tech-saturated cultures.15 There are no doubt 
other approaches we could take as well. 
																																								 																				
13	Cynthia	Breazeal’s	book	Designing	 sociable	 robots	 (2002),	 for	 example,	uses	engineering	and	
psychology	exclusively,	and	completely	ignores	the	performative	aspect	of	its	star	robot	Kismet.	
14	On	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 hybrid	 community	 of	 shared	 meaning,	 interests,	 and	 affects,	 see	 (Lestel	
1996b).		
15	On	this	subject,	see	Erik	Davis’	intriguing	book	TechGnosis:	myth,	magic,	&	mysticism	in	the	age	
of	information	(1999).	Thierry	Bardini	has	raised	this	aspect	of	modern	information	technology	in	
Bootstrapping:	Douglas	Engelbart,	coevolution,	and	the	origins	of	personal	computing	 (2000)	as	
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To Be Living Is Not a Property but a Plan 
Within a constructivist approach to the world, to be living is not a property but 
rather a relational and performative plan that activates skills or capacities without 
being reducible to them and without having a monopoly on them. Being alive 
involves a passive posture just as much as it mobilizes an active capacity. 
Westerners have great difficulty understanding this basic intuition because they 
have evolved within a culture that denigrates passivity and promotes action. 
Puppets and social robots only become living beings if we give them the 
opportunity to do so, by offering them an ecology in which they can live, and by 
successfully establishing a form of positive non-intervention with them.16 This 
suggestion is necessarily problematic in Western culture, where technology is 
experienced above all as a space of active participation. But the capacity to make 
an artifact be alive comes from the capacity to grant it hospitality in our living 
world, to transform ourselves in order to grant the status of living to ‘an other’, 
and to make our lives mutually compatible. The important idea here is that an 
artifact’s status as living does not depend solely on what it is or does, but on how 
we see ourselves and the ways in which we are ready to engage with it. In other 
words, it is a two-sided effort. It is precisely here that the question of the second-
person perspective becomes crucial, for the artifact acquires the status of living 
being through its ability to engage us with it as if it were living, and to do so in 
such a way that it becomes living. What makes a Paro17 alive is not that it tells us 
it loves us, but that we ourselves come to love it through the affection it lavishes 
on us and which we return. It becomes living because we feel it to be living, and 
we feel it to be living because it engages us in such a relation. With it, we 
construct a space in which the fact that it is alive has meaning.  
The crucial point to grasp here is that within a relational and constructivist 
perspective, there is no difference between affection and the simulation of 
affection. Indeed, this simulation can become very convincing if we mobilize ad 
hoc performative and relational plan to achieve this. A positivist would object that 
this is all an illusion. But when a child becomes distraught because someone 
wants to replace his/her Aibo18 with a different, identical Aibo, s/he feels negative 
emotions that are anything but simulated and which affect the child just as any 
negative emotion would. The key to understanding this lies in a very simple yet 
underestimated phenomenon: the non-transitivity of the simulation of affects. That 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 					
has	Fred	Turner	in	From	counterculture	to	cyberculture:	Stewart	Brand,	the	whole	earth	network,	
and	the	rise	of	digital	utopianism	(2006).	
16	The	Chinese	Taoists	had	a	term	for	such	positive	passivity:	wu	wei.		
17	Paro	is	a	very	popular	companion	robot	in	Japan	that	has	the	form	of	a	small	seal.		
18	Aibo,	a	dog-shaped	robot	built	by	Sony,	has	been	the	most	popular	companion	robot.		
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is to say, the fact that I can feel very intense affects on the basis of other, purely 
simulated affects is crucial. Even if the robot has only simulated affects, I can 
bring it into a technical-psychic trap that generates in me affects that I am not 
ready to accept as simulated. This leads me to recognize the robot as having a 
status not quite the same as a dog’s, but certainly very different from a toaster’s. 
In other words, I put myself in a position where I recognize the robot as living 
through its recognition of me. I attribute to it if not life, then at least a life, 
through a second-person perspective realized within a technical, restrictive plan 
that I have constructed to that end. We may wonder why it is that I need artifacts I 
consider living—but that is clearly a different question. The relevant point is that, 
in this way, I obtain a form of living agent that escapes biology. It is not because 
an artifact is living that we can behave with it the same way we do with living 
beings; rather, it is because we behave with it as if it were a living being that it 
ultimately becomes one. The objection of self-hypnosis one might be tempted to 
raise here thus does not carry much force, because the situation is not one of pure 
perception, but rather one of lives shared in practice and organized in a concrete 
world, which is in constant flux. 
The Robot’s Contaminating Nature 
In E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story ‘The Sandman’, one of the least-expected 
consequences of the automaton Olympia’s presence is that humans begin to doubt 
the nature of other humans surrounding them. Thus the German Romantic writer 
put his finger on a fundamental point: a robot is a contaminating creature. To be 
exposed to its presence leads us to doubt the nature of those around us: not who 
they are, but—more disturbingly—what they are. And rightly so, if we do not try 
to hide behind psychological pseudo-explanations. In the end, the robot reveals 
humanity’s little secret: not that humans are pure exteriority, but that their 
exteriority is constituted exactly in the same way as that of robots, through 
elaborate social and technical devices. A robot, after all, is a human reduced not 
only to pure appearance, but, above all, to pure exteriority. 
But are humans deeper than artifacts, or are they just more complex 
surfaces? Instead of getting indignant over such a suggestion, it is more useful to 
rethink what an appearance is and what a surface is. There is no reason that the 
latter should have the same meaning when applied to an object as to a living being, 
for a robot is precisely that intermediate entity for which the notion of surface 
means both appearance and exteriority; the two meanings emerge fully within a 
complex and subtle dynamic that the robot is able to arrange between the two. The 
robot’s freedom is very underdetermined, while the human’s is clearly 
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overdetermined. In general, both do what they must, and such voluntary 
subjection to the social order obviously connects them more strongly than any 
metaphysical characteristics we may identify or manipulate. In other words, La 
Boétie is more useful for understanding the human/robot convergence than 
Descartes. Rather than asking if robots have psychological interiority, we should 
ask if our societies are ready to provide them with a place where they—like the 
humans who already belong to our societies—can make real choices.  
Fictions 
Slavoj Žižek (2006), writing on Hegel (in his own inimitable creative way), asks 
how something like appearance can emerge in the midst of a dumb, flat reality 
that is just there. As Žižek goes on to specify, things do not only appear; they 
‘appear to appear’ (2006: 235). And they do so by mobilizing fictions. Fiction is 
necessary to access the real itself. This is what the Slovenian philosopher 
perspicaciously observes in the films of Polish director Krzysztof Kieslowski, 
whose work oscillates between fiction and documentary. Žižek’s conclusion is 
that at the most radical level, the reality of subjective experience can only be 
rendered as fiction. His argument is striking, but one of his premises bothers me. 
Why maintain the opposition between fiction and reality instead of considering, 
for example, that there are several layers of existence at once, more or less real 
and more or less imaginary? The tension between representations of robots—for 
example in the press and works of fiction—and what they ‘really’ are is itself part 
of the ‘robot phenomenon’. Robots are also what they seem to be. It is a bit too 
easy to see the popularizer’s representations as ‘errors’ or ‘abusive 
simplifications’, a bit too easy to distance oneself from what would from this 
point of view be obviously uncontrolled ‘drifts’. Robotics is a domain of fantasy, 
and it is in the very nature of the robot to always be graspable through more or 
less controlled fictions and more or less accepted imaginaries. This is never the 
case with, for example, a toaster, which will always be a toaster, no matter what 
we might dream of one day doing with it (though, in fact, apart from toasting 
bread, its uses do appear rather limited).19 
Becoming Artifact 
Conversely, the figure of the post-human reminds us that it is impossible to 
understand attempts to render matter living without also understanding the many 
																																								 																				
19	Of	course,	the	world	is	teeming	with	perverts	with	unbridled	imaginations…	
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attempts made by humans who long to become matter. For this, we can look to 
‘robot fetishists’, humans who seek to behave like robots; Cindy Jackson, the 
plastic surgery enthusiast, who has made a business out of her ‘dollification’; or 
Japanese women in Tokyo who invade ‘ningyô’ shops, where they have hyper-
realistic dolls of themselves made according to the instructions of masters whose 
reputations as doll-creators are soaring to new heights. The aspiration to become 
matter is not particular to young women experiencing the identity troubles 
inherent in adolescence (as well as in Japanese society). Certain scientists discuss 
similar themes, cloaking them in scientific respectability. The American 
philosopher Daniel Dennett (1997), for example, argues that we are the ‘direct 
descendants’ of self-replicating robots with whom living beings originated. Of 
course, he hastens to add:  
it certainly does not follow from the fact that we are descended from robots 
that we are robots ourselves. After all, we are also direct descendants of fish, 
and we are not fish; we are direct descendants of bacteria, and we are not 
bacteria. But […] we are made of robots—or, what comes to the same thing, 
we are each a collection of trillions of macromolecular machines. And all of 
these are ultimately descended from the original self-replicating 
macromolecules. So something made of robots can exhibit genuine 
consciousness, because you do if anything does (Dennett 1997: 24). 
Those who really wish to work toward becoming robots adopt this conviction, but 
from a different perspective: if we are all already robots, why not try to become 
better, higher-performing robots? An early example of such efforts is the 
cybernetics professor Kevin Warwick of the University of Reading. On Monday, 
August 24, 1998, at 4 p.m., Warwick shocked the scientific community by 
implanting an electronic chip (23 mm long and 3 mm in diameter) connected to 
his nervous system into his arm. He thus became, in his own words, the first 
Cyborg—that is, a Cybernetic Organism, part human and part machine. Thus, a 
computer can follow Warwick as he moves about the hallways of the Cybernetics 
Department; it can open doors, turn on lights, and use computers, all without 
Warwick lifting a finger. The implant can access all sorts of information, from 
credit card numbers to blood type and medical records. Such electronic tagging of 
the human, especially when it involves a sophisticated circuit of silicon chips, 
constitutes a relatively permanent form of identification. What an individual can 
do becomes directly linked to his/her status. As Warwick writes, individuals’ 
work hours, their exact locations within a building, and the company they keep 
can be determined at all times, so that they can be more easily contacted for 
messages or urgent meetings. As he adds, such a tool could also be extremely 
valuable for security purposes. Of course. A second experiment of the same nature 
took place on March 14, 2002: the project ‘Cyborg 2.0’. A surface of some 100 
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electrodes was surgically implanted into the median nerve fiber of Warwick’s left 
arm, then connected to a computer by radio signal. The objective was both to 
connect Warwick’s arm to the computer and vice versa. Warwick’s wife also 
participated in the experiment, so they could exchange emotional signals. Of 
course. 
Necessity to Think about Puppets to Understand Robots 
Ultimately, robotics is much closer to the traditional art of puppetry than most 
roboticians and theoreticians are willing to recognize.20 Thinking on marionettes 
and puppets is more realistic precisely because the artifacts involved have been 
definitively classified as entirely manipulated objects, and the puppeteer’s talent is 
seen to belong to the exclusive space of artistic representation. However, puppets 
are, above all, artifacts of the imagination, and for that reason are relevant to those 
interested in robots. Matthew Cohen (2007) has suggested, that they stimulate 
spectators and performers to fill in details in their imagination. For George 
Bernard Shaw (1965: 916), the intensity of marionettes’ unchanging facial 
expressions—an effect human actors cannot achieve—stimulates spectators’ 
imagination. Performers and spectators ‘conspire’, as Cohen says, in the 
performance, by attributing the illusion of life to marionettes and ‘co-creating’ 
them, so that puppets come to take on the appearance of having their own will. As 
the historian of puppetry Sally Jane Norman writes: 
Puppeteers must struggle and compromise when they animate their 
recalcitrant figures. They speak of the ‘surprises’ their puppets keep in store 
for them: locomotive tics initially seen as handicaps can gradually become 
essential expressive traits. Kinetic idiosyncrasies are not only functions of 
material components and structural traits; they can also come from 
automatisms integrated into the construction of a figure (Norman 1995). 
Marionettes are extensions of the human body and operate similarly to the media, 
according to Marshall MacLuhan; they are a means of communication that an 
audience amplifies and distorts. They are neither myself nor an other. They 
become concrete within a disturbing form of object-hood that overflows into 
personal expression and blends intimate familiarity with foreign otherness. 
The possibility of destroying or damaging them reinforces our 
conviction in their existence. Charles Baudelaire (1995 [1853]) was the first to 
																																								 																				
20	I	 presented	 this	 idea	 in	 a	 paper	 I	 gave	 in	 1993	 at	 the	 Brussels	 Free	University	 as	 part	 of	 an	
international	conference	on	artificial	 life.	 I	 suggested	that	artificial	 life	should	be	understood	at	
the	 intersection	 of	 the	 history	 of	 automatons	 and	 the	 history	 of	 puppets.	 This	 was	 of	 course	
roundly	rejected	by	the	engineers	in	attendance,	who	see	their	work	as	far	more	serious	than	the	
creation	of	super-puppets.	
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describe children’s confused enthusiasm for destroying their playthings as a way 
of attempting to see inside to the toy’s soul, and their ensuing disappointment as 
the result of observing the soul’s absence. A large part of adult puppetry, from 
Ubu to recent pieces, capitalizes on the marionette’s destructive ontology. The 
marionette invites itself through a performative ontology, but does so 
clandestinely, unlike robots, which claim life somewhat more aggressively. 
Gordon Craig’s 1917 piece, Romeo and Juliet: A Motion for Marionettes, depicts 
the gradual decomposition over the course of the play of Romeo, who loses his 
legs, arms, and an eye, and the simultaneous construction of Juliet, who begins as 
a half-figure with only a stick below the waist but by the end has fully developed 
into a person, with two legs and two arms. The magic of puppetry operates 
through a form of mediatized communication in which the object appears to have 
an independent will that surreptitiously intervenes between the puppeteer-actor’s 
will and the one to whom it is addressed.21 Puppets show us that the dichotomy 
between thing/living being is too simplistic and quite unsatisfying—and not only 
for children. Sergey Obraztsov dissolved the opposition between inert and living 
matter by using his own limbs as marionettes, thus giving ‘expressive autonomy 
to the various parts of his body, which were to live their own lives’ (Jurkowski 
2008: 48). Marionettes, by nature, are silent, and they can be magically destroyed 
or just as magically reconstructed, in more or less virtuoso performances. The 
faces of the characters in Wayang theatre are covered with sheets of paper on 
which protection charms are written to prevent malevolent spirits or tricksters 
from animating them. The radical opposition between what is alive and what is 
necessarily inert, between what is living and what is not, is specific to Western 
culture. Such a strict dichotomy cannot be found elsewhere. From this point of 
view, robotics is not only an engineering challenge; it is also a veritable cultural 
provocation, which we must face head-on in order to understand what is at stake.  
Conclusion: Expanding the Space of the Categories Mobilized for 
Conceptualizing the Living 
The question of the living does not call for a phenomenological, analytic, or 
scientific answer that would provide us with the true nature of the living, thereby 
determining once and for all whether or not machines may be part of this 
exclusive club. I have proposed a constructivist approach that seeks ways of 
letting machines live and cultivates the desire for them to be alive. It does not 
make much sense to ask whether or not machines can be alive; the question, rather, 
																																								 																				
21	In	his	1597	essay	'Of	simulation	and	dissimulation'	(reprinted	in	1986	in	The	essays),	Sir	Francis	
Bacon	provided	a	model	for	the	kind	of	ludic	dissimulation	that	characterizes	puppetry.	
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is whether we want them to be alive and if we are ready to give ourselves the 
means to make that happen. It is necessary to let machines live, for they will never 
be able to unless we create the opportunities for them to do so. The categories one 
could mobilize to talk about the living must be rethought, in order to provide an 
operational space that would allow these engaging fictions to constitute us, and, at 
the same time, to establish the nature of those with whom we share our existence. 
These fictions no doubt destabilize the very notion of existence by causing it to 
overflow its familiar semantic spaces, but this is a lesser evil. At first glance, 
some of these fictions appear very strange, but they also achieve a seductive 
relevance. The fact that the existence of certain agents is transmitted otherwise 
than through biological life—that is, by contamination rather than by 
reproduction—gets at the central question raised by existential robotics. We may 
think of robots as artifacts that trouble the complicities that permeate the interface 
between life and existence.  
Robotics as Performative Engineering for Capturing Affects and Desire 
It would be dangerous to directly apply Schull’s analysis of libidinal machines to 
the question of existential robotics, but her work on gambling does lead to a 
compelling hypothesis. In our reading, we find that at least one form of living can 
be understood through a technology of dependence on other living beings, while a 
certain kind of robotics can engineer the capture of affects and desires. Implicit in 
her text is a spectacular reversal of the logic of the Turing Test, where it is not the 
one who is co-opted by the observer who may be considered living, but, rather, 
the one who offers to become the observer’s host. Thus, a living being can be 
thought of as an agent that squats the affectivity of another living being down to 
its very ontology.  
Derrida, in his reading of Mauss, shows the potential of such an approach. 
In all of anthropology and metaphysics, the gift is always linked to debt—and, 
more precisely, a debt that cannot be repaid. ‘For there to be a gift, it is necessary 
that the donee not give back, amortize, reimburse, acquit himself, enter into a 
contract, and that he never have contracted a debt’ (Derrida 1992: 13). For Derrida, 
the ideal gift must not appear as a gift. The true gift requires that it be forgotten.  
But, after all, what would be a gift that fulfills the condition of the gift, namely, 
that it not appear as a gift, that it not be, exist, signify, want-to-say as gift? A 
gift without wanting, without wanting-to-say, an insignificant gift, a gift without 
intention to give? Why would we still call that a gift? (Derrida 1992: 27) 
For Derrida, only time can be given. Thus, unlike Mauss, Derrida dissociates the 
gift from exchange, clearly distinguishing between gifts related to ‘having’ and 
gifts related to ‘being’, by considering how the two forms of gifts mobilize 
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distinct semantic regimes. Derrida becomes even more interesting for me (without 
being convincing, however) when he observes that one can only give to a living 
being. According to Derrida, it makes no sense to say, for example, that one 
‘gives’ to the rain, to a mountain, or to a car—which leads him to groundlessly 
exclude such things from the space of the living. He does not ask the inverse 
question: from whom or from what is it possible to receive? To give existence; to 
receive existence. The tension there goes to the heart of an ontology of existential 
contamination beyond species and even beyond biology.  
Shattering the Binary between Being Alive/Being Dead 
In any case, we lack the vocabulary for approaching the ontology of social robots, 
which constantly oscillate between the physics of actions, the physiology of 
elementary components, and the logic of desire. We need, for example, a verb 
somewhere between ‘to be alive’ and ‘to become living’, which would mean 
something like ‘to become living in a manner specific to oneself’, and would 
describe a way of constituting oneself as a particular living being attached to other 
living beings through the composition of desires rather than through the transition 
of energies. The Western notion of being alive is overly rigid, and stands in 
opposition both to being dead (that is, having been alive) and being a thing (never 
having been alive and never having had the possibility of coming to life). 
However, being alive does not mean the same thing for a human, a chimpanzee, a 
slug, a bacterium, a plant, a mushroom, a virus or a robot. We need to invent a 
verb that indicates the degree of life that has been reached, as well as concepts for 
thinking the living in a multi-dimensional mosaic space that escapes the overly 
sharp binary logic we currently rely on. Limit-states of life (fetus, coma, etc.), 
modalities of life intensity (depression, etc.), and the multiplicity of sites of life 
(humans, animals, viruses, artifacts, ghosts, etc.) constitute the three areas that 
explode an overly binary view of the living. In other words, a technology such as 
existential robotics demonstrates quite clearly that Western thought has become 
too narrow to conceptualize some of the phenomena emerging within it, and that it 
must open itself up to other forms of thought: for example, Eastern, Far-Eastern, 
Australian Aborigine, or Amerindian. 
Adopting a Contradictory View of the Living 
Thus, we must adopt not only a pluralist but also a contradictory view of the 
living: that is, rather than there being a single state of the living that one can 
decisively identify and define in terms of necessary and sufficient properties—as 
deeply believed in Western culture—we must accept that there exist multiple 
phenomena of the living and that some may be based on mutually incompatible 
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logics. The idea that life can be expressed in very different—even contradictory—
modalities is never seriously considered in discussions of robotics. Even Chris 
Langton, one of the pioneers of artificial life, spoke of life as it could be. He did 
not imagine generating lives so much as the life that we privilege, which will 
always only be one modality among many others. It is thus less the philosophy of 
existential robotics that interests me, and more the transformations that such 
strange artifacts as social robots can bring about in our ways of being, of existing, 
of thinking about the world.  
Thinking Beyond Our Species’ Capacities 
If we want to fruitfully discuss the question of whether artifacts can be alive, we 
must not only significantly transform our conceptions of ‘life’ and ‘the living’, but 
also our idea of what constitutes a satisfying (or at least partially satisfying) 
answer to that question. We must become smarter than we are today if we really 
want to understand what a living being qua living being is, without focusing 
exclusively on a specific set of living beings. We run into two major problems in 
achieving this, but we are aware of only one of them. We think we can determine 
what a living being is. But we also think we have exhaustive knowledge of what a 
living being may be, and we are convinced that we can recognize one when 
confronted with it. Each of these seemingly simple propositions ultimately poses 
problems of such complexity that we may never be able to satisfactorily tackle. 
Scientists have always been convinced that humans represent a form of life—
indeed, the only form of life—capable of understanding all past, present, and 
future forms of life. But this ambition is probably far above the intellectual 
capacities of the species.  
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